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Welcome to the inaugural double issue of
the Corporate Reputation Review. At a time
when disciplines are fragmenting into
ever-more specialized domains, we are
pleased to announce the creation of an
integrative medium for research and prac-
tice about reputation management. Indeed,
the primary purpose of the Review is to
provide a forum for research-based discus-
sions about corporate reputations. We
expect these conversations to reflect the
diversity of academic disciplines that are
actively contributing to knowledge in this
area, whether grounded in strategic man-
agement, organization theory, economics,
marketing, communications, accounting,
or finance. As such, the Review will
assemble emerging scholarship about an
area that is proving to be of considerable
interest to scholars with widely divergent
orientations. In this way, we hope to
encourage a closer examination of corpo-
rate reputations and thereby stimulate the
growth of knowledge about the complex
socially constructed environments in
which companies operate.
We also intend the Corporate Reputation
Review to address the proliferating
demands by practitioners for answers to
questions about how reputations affect
competitive positioning, about how to
examine and value corporate reputations,
about how to build, maintain, and defend
those reputations (Hall, 1992). Many pro-
fessionals have a vested interest in develop-
ing answers to these questions, be they
chief executive ocers or strategic plan-
ners, brand managers or identity specialists,
accountants or financiers, heads of public
relations, community relations, investor
relations, customer relations, or employee
relations. In their everyday life, each is
deeply involved in managing a company’s
reputational assets. Yet all too few can iden-
tify and provide well-reasoned and defensible
answers to questions about corporate reputation
and reputational dynamics.
A key purpose of the Corporate Reputa-
tion Review, then, is to help remedy that
lack. Through conceptual articles, empiri-
cal research, case studies of best practice,
and occasional book reviews, we hope to
draw on the expertise of leading researchers
and practitioners concerned with corporate
identity and identification, the strategic
management of stakeholders, corporate
branding, the valuation of intangibles,
communication, crisis management, and
the socioeconomic analysis of competition.
CORPORATE REPUTATION: A
CROSSROADS OF CONVERGING
DISCIPLINES
Although corporate reputations are ubiqui-
tous, they remain relatively understudied
(Fombrun, 1996). In part, it is surely
because reputations are seldom noticed
until they are threatened. In part, however,
it is also a problem of definition. Accord-
ing to the ‘American Heritage Dictionary’
(1970: 600) ‘reputation’ is ‘the general esti-
mation in which one is held by the public’.
Yet how does such a definition apply to
companies? Who constitutes ‘the public’ of
a company, and what is being ‘estimated’
by that public? Given the diversity of audi-
ences companies address themselves to,
whose perceptions and judgments count
the most? Those of investors, employees,
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financial analysts, communities, regulators,
CEOs?
The lack of systematic attention to cor-
porate reputations can be traced to the
diversity of relevant academic and practi-
tioner literatures that explore different
facets of the construct (Fombrun and Rin-
dova, 1996). We point here to six distinct
literatures that are currently converging in
their emphasis on corporate reputations as
key but relatively neglected features of
companies and their environments.
The economic view
Economists view reputations as either traits
or signals. Game theorists describe reputa-
tions as character traits that distinguish
among ‘types’ of firms and can explain
their strategic behavior. Signalling theorists
call our attention to the informational con-
tent of reputations. Both acknowledge that
reputations are actually perceptions of
firms held by external observers.
Weigelt and Camerer (1988: 443) point
out that ‘. . . in game theory the reputation
of a player is the perception others have of
the player’s values . . . which determine his/
her choice of strategies’. Information asym-
metry forces external observers to rely on
proxies to describe the preferences of rivals
and their likely courses of action. Consu-
mers rely on firms’ reputations because
they have less information than managers
do about firms’ commitment to delivering
desirable product features like quality or
reliability (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980;
Stiglitz, 1989). Similarly, since outside
investors in firms’ securities are less
informed than managers about firms’
future actions, corporate reputations
increase investor confidence that managers
will act in ways that are reputation-consis-
tent. For game theorists, then, reputations
are functional: they generate perceptions
among employees, customers, investors,
competitors, and the general public about
what a company is, what it does, what it
stands for. These perceptions stabilize inter-
actions between a firm and its publics.
Signalling theorists concur: reputations
derive from the prior resource allocations
managers make to first-order activities
likely to create a perception of reliability
and predictability to outside observers
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Ross, 1977; Stig-
ler, 1962). Since many features of a com-
pany and its products are hidden from
view, reputations are information signals
that increase an observer’s confidence in
the firm’s products and services.
Naturally, then, managers can make stra-
tegic use of a company’s reputation to
signal its attractiveness. When the quality
of a company’s products and services is not
directly observable, high-quality producers
are said to invest in reputation-building in
order to signal their quality (Shapiro,
1983). Their prior investments in reputa-
tion-building allow them to charge pre-
mium prices, and may also earn them rents
from the repeat purchases that their quality
products will generate. In contrast, low-
quality producers avoid investing in repu-
tation-building because they do not foresee
repeat purchases (Allen, 1984; Bagwell,
1992; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).
In fact, similar dynamics may operate in
the capital and labor markets. For instance,
managers routinely try to signal investors
about their economic performance. Since
investors are more favorably disposed to
companies that demonstrate high and
stable earnings, managers often try to
smooth quarterly earnings and keep divi-
dend pay-out ratios high and fixed, despite
earnings fluctuations (Brealy and Myers,
1988). Sometimes companies pay a pre-
mium price to hire high-reputation audi-
tors and outside counsel. They rent the
reputations of their agents in order to
signal investors, regulators, and other pub-
lics about their firm’s probity and credibil-
ity (Wilson, 1985).
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The strategic view
To strategists, reputations are both assets
and mobility barriers (Caves and Porter,
1977). Established reputations impede
mobility and produce returns to firms
because they are dicult to imitate. By cir-
cumscribing firms’ actions and rivals’ reac-
tions, reputations are therefore a distinct
element of industry-level structure (Fom-
brun and Zajac, 1987).
Reputations are dicult to duplicate
because they derive from unique internal
features of firms. By accumulating the
history of firms’ interactions with stake-
holders they suggest to observers what
companies stand for (Freeman, 1984;
Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). Reputations
are also externally perceived, and so are
largely outside the direct control of
firms’ managers (Fombrun and Shanley,
1990). It takes time for a reputation to
coalesce in observers’ minds. Empirical
studies show that even when confronted
with negative information, observers
resist changing their reputational assess-
ments (Wartick, 1992). Therefore, reputa-
tions are valuable intangible assets
because they are inertial (Cramer &
Ruefli, 1994).
Like economists, then, strategists call
attention to the competitive benefits of
acquiring favorable reputations (Rindova
and Fombrun, 1997). They implicitly sup-
port a focus on the resource allocations
that firms must make over time to erect
reputational barriers to the mobility of
rivals (Barney, 1986). Since primary
resource allocations also stand to improve
organizational performance directly, how-
ever, it proves dicult to isolate their
unique impact on performance and reputa-
tion. This explains why empirical studies
have had diculty untangling a causal
ordering: both are produced by the same
underlying initiatives (McGuire, Sundgren,
and Schneeweiss, 1988; Chakravarthy,
1986).
The marketing view
In marketing research ‘reputation’ (often
labeled ‘brand image’) focuses on the
nature of information processing, resulting
in ‘pictures in the heads’ (Lippmann, 1922)
of external subjects, attributing cognitive
and affective meaning to cues received
about an object they were directly or indir-
ectly confronted with. ‘Objects’ in market-
ing research are predominantly ‘products’
(beer, detergents, computers), while consu-
mers seem to be the principal ‘subject’ of
analyses.
According to the notions of the Ela-
boration Likelihood Model of Petty and
Cacioppo (1986), information processing
results in three layers of elaboration: high,
medium and low. A high degree of ela-
boration of information about an object
results in a complex network of meanings
chunked in memory, enabling a subject to
give a sophisticated description of an
object. A low degree of elaboration results
in simple descriptions like ‘good/bad’ or
‘attractive/unattractive’. A medium degree
of elaboration creates a set of attributes
enabling a subject to describe an object in
terms of salient beliefs and evaluations
(Azjen and Fishbein, 1975; Poeisz, 1988).
The degree of elaboration is a conse-
quence of the existing knowledge of an
individual, the level of involvement of the
subject with the object, and the intensity
and integrated nature of the marketing
communications (Schultz, Lauterbron and
Tannenbaum, 1994) through which a
company tries to create an attractive,
desirable brand.
Building brand equity requires the crea-
tion of a familiar brand that has favorable,
strong and unique associations (Keller, 1993).
This can be done both through the initial
choice of the brand identity (the brand
name, the logo) and through the integra-
tion of brand identities into the supporting
marketing program so that consumers pur-
chase the product or service.
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Companies apply three types of brand-
ing strategies (Olins, 1978; Kotler, 1991):
individual names for all products without
any explicit mention of the company; all
products refer to the company, identifying
the company name on all products; or
combining the company name with the
product brand names. Preferences for one
of the three branding strategies has to be
based on the similarity between the endor-
ser and the inferred product/service. Most
marketing literature deals with an endorse-
ment of one brand by another brand in the
same product category (image transfer by
line extensions, Aaker and Keller, 1990;
Park, Milberg and Lawson, 1991), products
complementing each other (co-branding,
Rao and Ruekert, 1994) or linking organi-
zational associations (eg social responsibility
and financial performance) to product asso-
ciations (Belch and Belch, 1987; Keller and
Aaker, 1994). An endorsement will be
more successful if consumers perceive simi-
larity between the core brand and its
extension (Boush and Loken, 1991).
Umbrella branding (Kapferer, 1992;
Dawar, 1993) or more specific ‘corporate
branding’ (all processes that are inclined to
enhance the value of the corporate brand,
Maathuis and Van Riel, 1996) will be
more successful if the information asym-
metry between buyer and seller creates an
incentive for service providers to capitalize
on a firm’s reputation and introduce new
services for existing customers (Nayyar,
1990); when consumers perceive a high
degree of risk acquiring the product/ser-
vice; and finally, when the endorser’s attri-
butes are highly relevant in the context of
the intended processes of image transfer
(Keller, 1993; Brown and Dacin, 1997).
The organizational view
To organizational scholars, corporate repu-
tations are rooted in the sense-making
experiences of employees. A company’s
culture and identity shape a firm’s business
practices, as well as the kinds of relation-
ships that managers establish with key sta-
keholders. Corporate culture influences
managers’ perceptions and motivations
(Barney, 1986; Dutton and Penner, 1992).
Corporate identity affects how managers
both interpret and react to environmental
circumstances (Meyer, 1982; Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991). Shared cultural values
and a strong sense of identity therefore
guide managers, not only in defining what
their firms stand for, but in justifying their
strategies for interacting with key stake-
holders (Miles and Cameron, 1982; Porac
and Thomas, 1990).
Thick cultures homogenize perceptions
inside a firm and so increase the likelihood
that managers will make more consistent
self-presentations to external observers. By
creating focal principles, that is, general
understanding of the right way of doing
things in a firm, thick cultures contribute
to the consistency of firms’ images with
stakeholders (Camerer and Vepsalainen,
1988).
Identity and culture are related. Identity
describes core, enduring, and distinctive
features of a firm that produce shared
interpretations among managers about
how they should accommodate to external
circumstances (Albert and Whetten, 1985).
For instance, a comparative study of Bay
Area hospitals showed how each institution
responded differently to a strike because of
their distinct self-images (Meyer, 1982). A
case study of how the Port Authority
coped with the problem of homelessness in
New York demonstrated how an organiza-
tion’s self-image as a high-quality, first-
class institution played a central role in
constraining managers’ action to cope with
the problem (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991).
These reports suggest that firms with
strong, coherent cultures and identities are
more likely to engage in systematic efforts
to influence the perceptions of stakeholders.
Managers in such firms will probably
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attend carefully to how their firms’ key
audiences feel about them (Albert and
Whetten, 1985).
The sociological view
Most economic and strategic models ignore
the socio-cognitive process that actually
generates reputational rankings (Granovet-
ter, 1985; White, 1981). In contrast, organi-
zational sociologists point out that rankings
are social constructions that come into
being through the relationships that a focal
firm has with its stakeholders in a shared
institutional environment (Ashforth &
Gibbs, 1990). Firms have multiple evalua-
tors, each of whom apply different criteria
in assessing firms. However, these evalua-
tors interact within a common organiza-
tional field and exchange information,
including information about firms’ actions
relative to norms and expectations. Thus,
corporate reputations come to represent
aggregated assessments of firms’ institu-
tional prestige and describe the stratifica-
tion of the social system surrounding firms
and industries (Shapiro, 1987; DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983).
Faced with incomplete information
about firms’ actions, observers not only
interpret the signals that firms routinely
broadcast, but also rely on the evaluative
signals refracted by key intermediaries such
as market analysts, professional investors,
and reporters. Intermediaries are actors in
an organizational field. They transmit and
refract information among firms and their
stakeholders (Abrahamson and Fombrun,
1992). An empirical study of firms
involved in nuclear-waste disposal and
photovoltaic cell development demon-
strated how in both these industries reputa-
tional status depended, not only on
structural factors like company size and
economic performance, but also on a firm’s
position in the interaction networks linking
firms in each institutional field (Shrum and
Wuthnow, 1988).
To sociologists, then, reputations are
indicators of legitimacy: they are aggregate
assessments of firms’ performance relative
to expectations and norms in an institu-
tional field. Sociologists point to the multi-
plicity of actors involved in the process of
constructing reputations and their intercon-
nectedness.
The accounting view
A vocal group of academic accountants has
recently acknowledged the insuciency of
financial reporting standards in document-
ing the value of intangibles. They highlight
the widening gap between factual earnings
reported in annual statements and the
market valuations of companies. They also
criticize accepted practice that requires
managers to expense research and develop-
ment (R&D) activities, advertising, and
training expenses—activities which strate-
gists recognize as critical enhancements of
firms’ actual and perceptual resource posi-
tions (Scheutze, 1993; Lev and Sougiannis,
1996). As Deng and Lev (1997: 2) suggest,
current accounting practice induces a mis-
match in the allocation of costs to reven-
ues, and so misleads observers about the
earning capabilities of firms and the true
value of their assets. In regards to the
valuation of R&D, they conclude that
‘. . . hundreds of corporate executives, along
with their auditors appear to be able to
value R&D and technology in the devel-
opment stage. This apparent inconsistency
between the current regulatory environ-
ment which sanctions immediate expend-
ing of R&D and a fast developing business
practice, obviously deserves a careful
examination . . .’
Instead, many accounting researchers are
now calling for a broad-based effort to
develop better measures of how invest-
ments in branding, training, and research
build important stocks of intangible assets
not presently recorded in financial state-
ments—assets that, not coincidentally, are
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said by strategists to build higher reputa-
tional assessments among observers (Rin-
dova and Fombrun, 1997; Barney, 1986).
Appropriate capitalization of these expen-
ditures would better describe the value of a
company’s investments in what are funda-
mentally reputation-building activities.
Towards an integrative view
Jointly, these five academic literatures sug-
gest that reputations constitute subjective,
collective assessments of the trustworthiness
and reliability of firms, with the following
characteristics (Fombrun and Rindova,
1996).
— Reputations are derivative, second-order
characteristics of an industrial system
that crystallize the emergent status of
firms in an organization field.
— Reputations are the external reflection
of a company’s internal identity—itself
the outcome of sense-making by
employees about the company’s role in
society.
— Reputations develop from firms’ prior
resource allocations and histories and
constitute mobility barriers that constrain
both firms’ own actions and rivals’
reactions.
— Reputations summarize assessments of
past performance by diverse evaluators
who assess firms’ ability and potential
to satisfy diverse criteria.
— Reputations derive from multiple but
related images of firms among all of a
firm’s stakeholders, and inform about
their overall attractiveness to employees,
consumers, investors, and local commu-
nities. Simplifying the complex con-
struct of performance helps observers
deal with the complexity of the mar-
ketplace.
— Reputations embody two fundamental
dimensions of firms’ effectiveness: an
appraisal of firms’ economic performance,
and an appraisal of firms’ success in ful-
filling social responsibilities (Etzioni,
1988; Lydenberg et al., 1986).
Consistent with these characteristics, we
therefore propose the following definition
(Fombrun and Rindova, 1996): A corporate
reputation is a collective representation of a
firm’s past actions and results that describes the
firm’s ability to deliver valued outcomes to mul-
tiple stakeholders. It gauges a firm’s relative
standing both internally with employees and
externally with its stakeholders, in both its
competitive and institutional environments.
OUR DOMAIN . . . OUR CHARTER
The Corporate Reputation Review invites
original research that explores the growing
convergence between these six academic
literatures, between corporate reputation
and strategic positioning; corporate iden-
tity, communications, and image; brand-
ing and profiling; valuation and
performance. In particular, we welcome
rigorously conducted research, including
quantitative, qualitative, experimental, and
field studies.
At heart, therefore, the Corporate Reputa-
tion Review discourages contributions that
are exclusively focused on a narrow disci-
plinary perspective, whether from advertis-
ing, public relations, speech
communication, journalism, media studies,
organizational analysis, or strategic man-
agement. These belong in appropriate spe-
cialized publications. Suitable articles
should reveal authors’ familiarity and
understanding with complementary posi-
tions in relevant disciplines. For instance,
relevant articles might examine how repu-
tations:
— evolve from employee communications
through a process of organizational
identification;
— relate to a firm’s social responsibility
and its grassroots management activ-
ities;
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— develop from consolidated approaches
to marketing, organization, and strat-
egy;
— are orchestrated internally through joint
programs for managing investors,
employees, customers, analysts, and
regulators.
The Corporate Reputation Review also
invites contributions from practitioners
that address the strategic development and
maintenance of corporate reputations.
Practitioners’ articles will be reviewed by
the editors and by members of our Execu-
tive Advisory Panel. Topics could include
best practice in crisis management, media
relations, employee involvement programs,
packaging and design, advertising cam-
paigns, strategic reorientations, and their
implications for a company’s reputation.
Occasionally, the Review will also publish
relevant book reviews that address impor-
tant topics related to reputational manage-
ment.
Ultimately, the Corporate Reputation
Review targets a core audience of aca-
demics, client practitioners, journalists, and
management consultants interested in repu-
tation management. The Review should
also be of considerable relevance to senior
executives responsible for nurturing and
defending corporate reputations. In addi-
tion, likely to welcome the Review are pro-
fessionals whose everyday life revolves
around building, maintaining, or defending
reputation, be they identified with strategic
management, investor relations, public
relations, marketing, advertising, employee
communications, or public affairs.
THE CONFERENCE ON CORPORATE
REPUTATION, IMAGE, AND
COMPETITIVENESS—JANUARY 17–18,
1997
To iniatiate dialogue and celebrate the
launching of the Corporate Reputation
Review, we organized a conference at the
Stern School of Business at New York
University on January 17–18, 1997. The
conference was sponsored by the Royal
Dutch/Shell group of companies, and
brought together a multi-disciplinary
group of international scholars and practi-
tioners to discuss their research and experi-
ence in the area of reputation management.
We organized the presentations around
five themes.
— How reputations develop
— How valuable are reputations
— How reputations affect corporate per-
formance
— How reputations have other favorable
and unfavorable consequences
— How reputations should be managed in
good times and bad times
In this inaugural issue of the Corporate
Reputation Review, we capture the essence
of the conceptual, empirical, and case-
based contributions made by conference
participants during their stay in New
York. In particular, we asked contributors
to abridge and revise their comments for
this issue, in the belief that the inaugural
issue would have greater impact if it pre-
sented a complete picture of the ‘reputa-
tional landscape’. In so doing, of course,
we risk over-simplification: authors’ ideas
are necessarily less fully articulated than
they would otherwise be in more extensive
expositions. By encompassing the breadth
of sessions in the conference, doubtless we
have distorted the individual ‘trees’ of the
reputational forest. We defend doing so
here, however, because we believe the ben-
efits of breadth outweigh the costs of depth
in this fragmented domain. The inaugural
issue therefore clearly emphasizes our
common agenda rather than our many dif-
ferences.
If all goes according to plan, researchers
and practitioners will have ample opportu-
nity to articulate more fully their evolving
views in subsequent issues of the Corporate
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Reputation Review. As editors, we look for-
ward to helping authors develop their ideas
into valuable contributions to knowledge
and understanding about corporate reputa-
tions. We embark on this challenging jour-
ney full of hope and not a little trepidation
at the considerable responsibility it will
entail. We hope you will join us in this
exciting endeavor.
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